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.IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A complaint was filed against Dick Smith, the 
appellant, on October 28th, 1953, charging him with 
the crime of pondering committed as follows: "That 
Dick Smith the above named defendant, in Weber 
County, State of Utah, between November 1, 1951 
and March 20, 1952 committed a felony, to-wit: 
Pandering as follows, Dick Smith, induced, persuaded, 
encouraged, inveigled and enticed a female person, 
Norma Lee Stone, to become a prostitute ... 
Preliminary examination was had October 31st, 
1953, a Court Reporter being present and making o 
transcript of the testimony, defendant was bouncl over 
to the District Court where an information was filed 
Novernber 19th, 1953, to which defendant pleaded 
"not guilty" November 23rd, 1953, and trial was set 
for November 30th, 1953. The information charged 
the defendant with the crime of pandering, committed 
page 1 
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:ss folio•.vs: 11 Dick Smith having heretofore been 
duly committed by Charles H. Sneddon, a com• 
mitting magistrate of this County to this Court, to 
answer this charge, is accused by the District 
Attorney of this Judie ial District, by this informa-
tion, of the crime of pandering committed as 
follows, to-wit: Dick Smith induced, persuaded-, 
encouraged, inveigled and enticed a female per-
son, Norma Lee Stone, to become a prostitute." 
From the conviction of the appellant to the 
iury and the imposed sentence this appeal is 
taken. Discussicn of the evidence so far as it re· 
lates to the questions which this appeal raises will 
be mode os the various motters upon which defen-
dant relies are discussed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The argument in this case will follow the 
points below given. 
Page 2 
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Point No. I. 
That the Court committed error in denying the 
defendant~s motion to dismiss the prosecution, made 
at the close of the State's case, and based upon the 
ground that the on I y witness whose testimony con-
nected the defendant with the alleged offense was 
Norma lee Stone, whose testimony was not su£Rcient 
to convict without corroboration. 
Point No. 2. 
That the Court committed error in that it refused 
to give the defendant's requested instruction No. I 
(Tr. 008) relating to necessity of corroboration of an 
accomplice. 
Point No. 3. 
Error committed by the Court in rulings sustain-
ing obiections made, and orders by the Court made 
without obiection by the prosecution, limiting evi-
dence sought to be adduced by defendant. 
Page 3 
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ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1 
11 That the Court committed error in denying 
the defendant's motion to dismiss the prosecution, 
made at the close of the State's case, and based 
upon the ground that the only witness whose testi-
monv connected the defendant with the alteged 
offense was Norma Lee Stone, whose testimony, 
was not sufficient to convict without corroboration. 11 
It is the contention of the defendant thdt Sec-
tion 77-31-141 Utah Code Ann. 1953, became 
applicable to this case 1 upon the prosecution prof-
fering evidence that Norma lee Stone 1 the com-
plaining witness, was a previously chaste person. 
The statute cited provides as follows: 
11upon a trial for procuring or 
attempting to procure an abortion, or 
aiding or assisting therein, or for in-
veigling, enticing, or taking away 
any female of previously chaste char-
page 4 
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acter for the purpose of prostitution, 
or aiding or assisting therein, the 
defendant shall not be convicted 
upon the testimony of the woman 
upon or whh whom the offense was 
committed, unless she is corrobora-
ted by other evidence. 11 
It will be observed that this enaetment is not 
limited to one class of offenses but is intended as 
an extension of the general statute respecting 
conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of 
an accomplice, under whieh sueh a woman, since 
not herself subiect to prosecution for the same 
offense as that charged, would not be an accom-
plice. It would apply to every case where the 
offense proved is inveigling or enticing such a 
female for the purpose of prostitution. The word 
"taking" has relation to the offense defined in 
Section 76-53-20, which makes such o taking of 
such a female from her parents or other lawful 
custodian, she being under the age of 18 years, a 
page 5 
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felony. The provisions of Section 77-31-14 do not 
contain that age I imitation. 
This enactment was intended to enlarge the 
definition of an accomplice by including in the class 
of persons whose testimony required corroboration 
females of previously chaste character who are en-
ticed or inveigled into a life of prostitution. It is 
to be observed that the only section of our penal 
code which makes prior chastity an element of an 
offense is Section 76-53-20, which has to do with 
taking for the purpose of prostitution such a chaste 
female, under 18 years of age, from the custody of 
a parent or guardian, the latter two elements not 
being included in the provisions of Section 77-31-14. 
The latter statute includes 11 taking" as an alternative 
element, but does not include 11 inveigling or entic-
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If then this statute, so extending the neces-
sity of corroboration to witness not ordinarily fall-
ing within the definition of on accomplice is to be 
read giving meaning to all of its phrases, it must 
be understood as covering all sexual cases involv-
ing prostitution, where the complaining witness 
has been previously chaste, pondering included. 
Chastity being no element of such other offenses, 
it is submitted that the statute is rendered meaning-
less unless it is intended to apply where it appears in 
the trial that the witness was chaste prior to the en-
ticement of the defendant, and so must apply whe-
ther the charge. contains on allegation of such 
chastity or not. 
What are the facts here? The opening state-
ment of the public prosecutor contains a recital of 
the facts which he intended to prove to estobl ish 
the State's case. The recital shows a visit by Mrs. 
page 7. 
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Stone to Smith's living quarters, where they drank 
together, and where, she said, he first "began 
making remarks about her becoming a prostitute 11 • 
After that, said the prosecutor, the defendant 
took Mrs. Stone home, and 11further enlightened her 
upon this subiect, and asked her her desires in the 
matter and told her some of the advantages of be· 
coming a prostitute 11 • Then the statement related 
continuing efforts along the same I ine, which after 
some period of time resulted in her engaging in acts 
of prostitution both in Utah and Wyoming. This 
statement clearly indicates that the state based its 
charges upon an enticement whose beginning dated 
back to that first visit to the defendant's quarters at 
the Millstream Motel. The statement was followed 
up by testimony from Mrs. Stone which also began 
with that motel visit, and followed through her 
narrative of her relations with the defendant in sub-
page 8. 
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stantially similar order as that given in the opening 
statement. The witness then testified (Tr~ . 21) that 
she never had engaged in prostihJioon prior to meet-
ing Mr. Smith -- not in direct statement perhaps of 
chastity, but since she had told at length of illicit 
relations with Smith, we think may be treated as, 
and was considered by the witness and iury as mean-
ing that, prior to those relations, she had been a 
chaste woman. 
There is nothing in the record which in any wise 
tends to connect the defendant with the crime involv-
ed. The witness Arlyn Garside, the complaining wit-
ness in this case, testified (Tr. 24) to seeing Mrs. 
Stone and Mr. Smith talking in Louigi's Cafe--a 
fact to which Mrs. Stone had testified; that he saw 
her in the Grill Cafe working as a waitress at a time 
when Mr. Smith came to see him about getting a beer 
I icense for that cafe; that she disappeared for a time, 
page 9. 
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and he thereafter saw her about town with other 
men; and that subsequently (Tr. 25) he had con-
verstitions with her at her request. The witness L. J. 
Jacobson (Tr. 26) testified to seeing Mrs. Stone and 
the defendant together in the same cafe, and riding 
together in a car. None of these facts corroborate 
the testimony of Mrs. Stone as to any oct of any 
kind incidental to the offense charged. 
The witness Jean Orlob, a sister of the witness 
Stone, testified to visits to her home (Tr. 22) by her 
sister and the defendant, and to some conversation 
in which "joking" the defendant said something to 
the effect that her sister could "make more rather 
than working in a restaurant", that all she recalled 
was that the defendant hod said that her sister could 
get _further than just working in a restaurant. To 
.~onsider such testimony, charocterized by the wit-
ness as "ioking", evidently so said that her sensibili-
page 10 
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ties were not shocked, and the incident barely re-
membered, as corroboration of the charge of entice• 
ment to prostitution, would resuh in a rule of evidence 
exposing any suitor of a woman, subsequently iilted, 
to conviction upon her evidence of Hlici.t relations, 
without any showing of opportunity or other facts ex-
cept presence together in various places where no 
chance for guih could arise, plus bad taste in conver-
sation. 
Corroboration must go further. This Court has 
frequently defined such corroboration as being proof 
of material facts which constitute a necessary element 
of the crime charged. 
State v. Spencer, 15 U. 149, 49 P. 302 
Tending to implicate the defendant in and connect him 
with the offense charged. 
State v. Collett, 20 U. 290, 58 P. 684 
The many cases cited in the footnote to Section 77-31--1-8, 
page 11 
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Utah Code Ann. 1953, which is the general statute 
as to testimony of accomplices continue to support 
the rule laid down in the two eorty cc;tses above 
cited. 
Point No. 2. 
11That the Court committed error in that it re-
fused to give the defendant's requested Instruction 
No. 1 (Tr. 008) relating to the necessity of corrob-
oration of an accomplice". 
The argument given under Point No. I covers 
this point; also, it should be noted that in 
State v. Hall, 112 U. 272, 186 P.2d. 
970 
this Court ruled that where the testimony of an ac-
compl ice was in the record, failure of the Court to 
instruct on the need of corroboration even though 
no request was made by defendant's counsel for 
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Point No. 3 
... frror committed by the Court in rulings sus-
toining obiections made, and orders by the Court 
made without obiection by the prosecution, limit-
ing evidence sought to be adduced by defendant. " 
Defendant sought (Tr. 19) to interrogate Mrs. 
Stone on cross-examination as to some incident 
which had occurred in connection with her visit to 
the office of the father of Defendant's counsel . fn 
laying a foundation the following occurred: (Tr. 
19) 
"0. Did you go to my father's office 
about a year and a half ago? 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Dobbs, that 
is privileged testimony and there is 
no use asking that. 
Q. Your Honor, there is no privileged 
testimony if there was no client-
attomey relationship. 
THE COURT: Apparently you asked if 
she is a client, and she said "no". 
Now you are asking if she went to 
page 13 
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solicit you as a client. 
Q. I'm not asking her that. I'm 
just asking if she went to see my 
father. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm barring the 
testimony on the ground of Client-
attorney relationship." 
The conduct of the Court imp I ied without evi-
dence 1 that the visit of the witness to the offices 
of the father of defendant's counsel, was a visit to 
a lawyer--perhaps a matter of iudic ial notice--but 
went further by assuming, after the witness had 
affirmative I y testified that she had never been a 
client of either the father or of counsel, that neces-
sarily a relationship of Client-Attomey arose from 
the mere evidence of a visit. She was not even per-
mitted to answer a question which was pre I iminary in 
character 1 one laying a foundation for further evi-
dence which counsel was barred by the Court from 
entering into. The action by the Court was without 
page 14 
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ground, not based upon any cbiection of the pro-
secution, and preiudicial to the defendant. 
Subsequently (Tr. 19 - 20) the following took 
place: 
"Q Mrs. Smith (Stone), who was 
the officer that contacted you 
in relation to this action? 
A Mr. Garside. 
Q. Have you talked to Mr. Garside 
quite a bit about this matter? 
A. Considerable. 
Q. What has he told you would hap• 
pen to you if you didn't testify? 
MR. RICHARDS: I obiect to this, 
Your Honor, on the grounds it's 
outside of the direct examination. 
If counsel wants to make her his 
witness on his case, that is agree-
able, but as to this part it's 
improper. 
THE COURT: The obiection is sus-
tained to the form of the ques-
tion ... 
The obiection was improperly sustained. A 
page 15 
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party to I i tigation of any eharac ter may e ross-
examine an opposing witness as to matters tending 
to show bios, duress, or other matters tending to 
prove that the testimony was not freely given, with-
out undertaking the burden of making a witness, pre• 
sumably hostile, his witness. 
11 A witness may be cross-examined as to 
irrelevant matters in order to discredit 
his testimony by what he himself may 
state in answer. In fact this line of in-
quiry is the principal factor in establish-
ing cross-examination as one of the chief 
agencies for development of the truth 
in iudic ial inquiries. By means thereof 
the relation of the witness to the cause 
or the parties, his bias or interest, if he 
has any, his character for truth and 
veracity, indeed any collateral foe t 
which may bear on his truthfulness and 
impartiality, may be brought to I ight. 
Any question, although irrelevent or 
remote, may be p\lt if it reasonably 
tends to explain, contradict, or discre-
dit any testimony given by him, or to 
test his accuracy, memory, veracity or 
credibility. It is always permissible on 
cross-examination to lay a foundation 
for impeaching the witness by proof of 
prior contradictory statements." 
(58 Am. Jr. 346 - 341) 
page 16 
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There simply is no authority which supports 
any right of the Court to require a defendant to 
make an adverse witness, particularly the aggre ived 
herself, his witness for the purpose of such impeach-
ment, yet this is exactly what happened in this 
case. Obviously the question was foundational, 
intended to elicit from the witness an answer indi-
cating thot her testimony had been induced by 
sorne threat or promise of the officer named. He 
had already testified (Tr. 25) to his talk with her, 
at a time a month before the tri-al, and iust prior 
to the filing of the complaint before the commit-
ting magistrate, October 28th, 1953 (Tr. 001). 
To refuse defendant the right even to lay a foun-
dation for impeachment by a showing of duress, 
threats, promises, or other action inducing the 
complainant, obviously was error. 
Again after Mrs. Stone had been recalled for 
page 17. 
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further examination, the following took place at the 
inception (Tr. 33-34) of her cross-examination: 
"Q. Mrs. Smith. At the pre I iminary 
hearing, when you were being 
questioned as to this money, five 
or six thousand dollars, you stated 
--Mr. Richards asked you how 
much of that money has he returned 
to you. 
nANSWER: Nothing. 
QUESTION: Did you ever ask for it? 
ANSWER: Just----." 
MR. ANDERSON: I obiect to this~ 
Your Honor on the grounds it's 
improper cross examination. 
Counsel is reading into the record 
the record of the pre I iminory hear• 
ing. If he is trying to impeach 
this record 1 we have no obiection 
him trying to do that. 
THt COURT: If you ara going to use for 
impeachment, you've got to ask the 
impeaching question first 1 Mr. 
Dobbs. 
Q Your Honor, I am not particularly 
trying to impeach her. I'm iust 
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THE COURT: That is impeachment. 
If you want to impeach her testi-
mony, you w iII have to ask her 
impeaching questions. 11 
The impeaching questions had already been 
asked, Mrs. Stone had testified (Tr. 16) that she 
had testified at the preliminary examination, in 
front of a reporter. The foundation for her im-
peachment by the record of her former testimony 
had been laid. The Court while insisting that 
impeaching questions must be asked, hal ted coun-
sel in the very act of asking such questions. 
Counsel, to complete the record, called 
Mrs. Stone as a witness for the defendcm,t. Mrs. 
Stone again testified (Tr. 38) to having been a 
witness at the preliminary examination, and the 
following took place: 
"Q~ You testified at that time -· will , 
you tell me if these were the words 
that you used? 
MR .. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I ob-
page 19. 
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iect to this as being leading. 
THE COURT: Well, the only purpose 
you would have would be impeach-
ing questions, so you haven't 
asked an impeaching question. 
You were advised to ask your im-
peaching questions if you want to 
bring this in. 
Q. Your Honor, I think I have al· 
ready made the impeaching ques-
tions on her first testimony and 
brought part of the record in. I 
don't know why it should be ob-
iectionable now. 
THE COURT: You only brought part 
of the record in before it was ob• 
iected to. But the only thing you 
have now is to impeach her. If 
you will state your impeaching 
questions which you now wish to 
impeach her on. I don't recall if 
you did ask her. 
later, while a witness for the defense# Mrs. 
5tone did testify to threats that she might lose the 
custody of her child, made by Officer Garside, 
(Tr. 41) and the following took place: 
"Q. Did he also say had a chance of 
being prosecuted for prostitution? 
page 20 
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MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I ob-
iect to that. 
THE COURT: Why are you obiecting 
at this late date? 
MR. ANDERSON: The statute protects 
her on this score. 
THE COURT: Well, I know. You 
didn't obiect before. 
A. Do I answer? 
THE COURT: No. f told you, Mr. 
Dobbs, you had to tell the person 
and pi ace , and not just anyone --
the time and place in order for 
her to answer those questions. " 
So defendant was barred from interro-
gotion, even after he had made Mrs. Stone his 
own witne55, upon a matter whose materiality as 
showing her bias and preiudice was evident. 
The nature of the testimony sought to be 
elieited by these various attempts of counsel to 
impeach Mrs. Stone •s testimony had been made 
known to the Court in the opening statement of 
page 21 
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defendant's case, (Tr. 6) the statement being 
thot the defendant's case rested upon the question 
of whether Mrs. Stone had been coerced into prose-
cuting by members of the City Police Force, and 
that the iury ultimately must decide whether Mrs. 
Stone was telling the truth, or lying because she was 
forced to I ie . 
This Court has time and again made references 
to the nature of the burden which a defendant must 
bear when charged with sezuol offenses, and where 
the sole proof of the offense, and the sole proof of 
his innocence, must rest upon the belief which the 
testimony of the woman, and the man, and has 
approved the rule that under such circumstances, 
the evidence of the complaint must be received 
with great caution, and that the widest cross-
examination is permissible. 
State v. Mills 249 P. 2d. 211, - U -
page 22 
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State v. Reese, 43 U. 447, 
135 p. 270 
Morris v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 241, 
131 p. 731 
Williams v. State, 61 Okl. Cr. 396, 
68 p. 2d 530 
Under exactly similar circumstances, where 
prejudice had been aroused (Tr. 46, 47, 48) by 
elicitation from defendant that one of his sources 
of income was playing punchboards, where he had 
been asked numerous questions as to relations with 
other women, of a character obviously intended to 
arouse in the minds of the ;ury on inference that he 
had been guilty of pandering in other instances, where 
the Court hod permitted, over defendant's obiection, 
the introduction of testimony of such other offenses, 
the denial by the Court of the right of impeachment, 
both on direct and cross-examination could hardly 
fail to be pre iudic ial to the defendant. 
The Court's attention is directed to the bring• 
ing in of inadmissible matter both by cross-examin-
page 23 
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ation of the defe •. t and reception of evidence 
from Norma lee Stone (Tr. 55-56), and Arlene 
Berrett (Tr. 57) as to payments of the proceeds of 
prostitution, over the obiection of the defendant. 
On cross-examination the prosecution had asked 
defendant as to his ever having received the pro-
ceeds of prostitution from fallen women, particu-
larly including (Tr. 48 et. seq.) Arlene Berrett 
and "the I ady who formerly was your wife", 
Helen Smith. Obiections by defense counsel to 
these questions were overruled, and the questions 
were answered negatively by the defendant. On 
rebuttal, (Tr. 55) Mrs. Stone was again recalled, 
allowed to testify (Tr. 56) to seeing Helen Smith 
pay money to the defendant which she had earned 
in prostitution with no effort made to ascertain 
any possibility of the witness being able to give 
any answer not based upon guess work; and Arlene 
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Berrett was called upon to testify (Tr. 58 - 59) 
that she had paid moneys to Dick Smith that she 
had earned in prostitution. The witness thereafter 
(Tr. 60) refused to answer upon the constitutional 
ground to which Senator McCarthy takes much ex-
ception, as to her having been a pra&litute. She 
was also permitted to answer (Tr. 59) that she 
had seen Helen Smith pay moneys to Dick Smith 
which she hod earned in prostitution, and when 
the defense counsel obiected to the question 
upon grounds of want of proof that Helen Smith 
was a prostitute, the Court erroneously ruled 
that the answer might be made, because that 
identical question had been asked the defendant, 
and such receipt by him denied, in spite of total 
want of proof that Mrs. Smith was a prostitute. 
In fact on the basis of the testimony of Norma 
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Smith was prosecuted in the District Court in 
and for Weber County for the crime of Periury 
and was acquitted. In fact the whole reason 
for the production of the testimony, that so pre-
iudiced. the cause of the defendant so badly, was 
for the sole and only purpose of laying a basis 
for such charge of perjury. 
This Court has commenc ted in "State v. 
Hougesen, 91 Utah 351 1 64 P. 2d 229, upon 
the wide variances of viewpoint among appellate 
courts as to how far proof of independent crimes 
may be adduced by cross-examination of a de-
fendant 1 and in the opinion in which aft Jus• 
tices of the Court concur 1 there are laid down 
rules under which such questions are admissible, 
and under which answer to this type of question 
addressed to Mr. Smith would be enforced or 
excused in the sound discretion of the Court 
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(pg. 238) as answers going to the credibility of 
the witness, even though not relevant nor mater-
ial to the offense then on trial before the Court. 
A different question presents itself when the 
attempt is made to impeach the defendant by 
testimony as to such matters irrelevant to the 
pending prosecution. 
"Regardless of whether, for the pur-
pose of impeachment of a witness, a 
scope of an inquiry is confined to 
general reputation for veracity or ex-
tended to general moral character, 
the authorities are quite uniform in 
holding that the character of a witness 
may not be impeached by independent 
proof of particular acts of immorality 
or of wrong doing; that is a witness 
may not be discredited by testimony 
of other witnesses or by independent 
e~idence as to particular incidences 
of misconduct. Such evidence is re-
iected because of the confusion of 
issues and waste of time that would be 
involved and because the witnesses 
cannot know what charges may be made 
and cannot be prepared to expose their 
falsity. 11 
(58Am. Jr. 411-12) 
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.. The answers of a witness on cross-
examination with reference to matters 
relevant to an issue are not conclusive 
and may be contradicted by independent 
proof for th' purpose of impeachment. 
But it is firmly established that the 
answer of a witness on cross-examina-
tion as to Cf merely collateral matter 
is binding pn the cross-examinee, and 
may not be contradicted. The princi-
pal reasons of the rule are, undoubtedly, 
that but for its enforcement the issues 
in a cause would be multiplied inde-
finitely, the real merits of the contro• 
versy would be lost sight of in the mass 
of testimony to immaterial points, the 
minds of iurors would thus be per-
plexed and confused, and their atten-
tion wearied and distracted, the costs 
of litigation would be enormously 
increased, and iudic ial investigations 
would become almost in terminable. " 
(58 Am. Jr. 433) 
"As to whether matter is collateral 
within the rule precluding proof of the 
falsity of testimony concerning facts 
collateral to the issue, the test is 
whether the fact shown by the answer 
could be shown in evidence for any 
independent purpose, or whether the 
cross-examiner would be allowed on 
his part to prove the matter. If so, 
then the matter may be contradicted. 
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This test is not infallible, and does 
not apply to the impeachment of a wit-
ness by showing that he has been con-
ficted of a crime or is biased." 
(58 Am. Jr. 433- 434) 
~~------lt may be regarded as settled, 
however, that the answer of a witness 
to questions regarding specific acts 
which would show his past conduct, 
antecedents, and character, or to 
questions which tend to disgrace him, 
are final and cannot be contradicted ..• " 
(58 Am. Jr. 434) 
"The rule precluding a cross examiner 
from contradicting by other evidence 
answers to questions relating to collater-
al matters has been frequently applied 
in criminal cases. Indeed, a violation 
of the rule in such a prosecution may 
constitute preiudicial error. - - - - - 11 
(58 Am. Jur. 435 - 436) 
None of the offenses, as to which such 
cross examination was had or such rebuttal 
made, were matters in any wise connected with 
the crime charged in the information. They tended 
in each case to be as to matters as to which the 
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defendant could not be prepared to expose the 
falsity of the statements, they were offered and 
admissible solely for the purpose of discrediting 
the character of the defendant, and we urge that 
admission of thi$ testimony over the objections of 
defendant was highly preiudicial to his cause be-
fore the i ury. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon the matters herein discussed, the de-
fendant by his counsel submits that the defen-
dant's conviction should be reversed and the de-
fendant granted the new trial for which he moved. 
(Tr. 012). 
Respectfully submitted, 
DOBBS & DOBBS 
Counsel for Defendant 
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